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Abstract
We analyze personalized pricing by a monopsonist facing a nite number of ex
ante identical, capacity constrained suppliers with privately known costs. When the
distribution of costs is su¢ ciently smooth and regular, the buyer chooses to make
the same o¤er to all suppliers, leading to a posted price. This price is lower than
the classical monopsony price if the demand function is concave, and higher if the
demand is convex. In the limit as the seller capacities tend to zero we obtain the
classical monopsony price. Therefore, our model provides a decentralized micro-
foundation for monopsony.
We gratefully acknowledge nancial support from the ESRC (Transparency in Procurement,
ES/N00776X/1). We also thank Simon Board and seminar participants at the European University
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1 Introduction
The classical model of monopsony postulates a single buyer who faces a deterministic
supply curve resulting from the aggregation of suppliers (marginal) costs. It is well-
known that the optimal linear (posted) price equates the mark-down1 to the reciprocal
of this supplys elasticity. Even if the monopsonist could o¤er di¤erent prices to di¤erent
suppliers, or not to make o¤ers to some of them, this linear price would still be optimal
as long as the monopsonist does not know where in the supply function each supplier
is located. Indeed, a deterministic supply guarantees that the monopsonist knows with
certainty the quantity purchased at each price.
The situation is di¤erent when the monopsonist faces uncertainty about supply, say,
due to asymmetric information about costs. Even if suppliers are indistinguishable and
even if (cost) uncertainty is independent across suppliers, in that case the monopsonist
faces (aggregate) uncertainty about the total supply it receives for any given price vector.
To deal with this uncertainty, there is a potential role both for di¤erent price o¤ers to
di¤erent (ex ante identical) suppliers and for excluding some suppliers from the o¤ers.
In this paper we study the optimal discriminatory price policy for a monopsonist that
faces this type of aggregate uncertainty. We obtain conditions under which linear prices,
that is, a common price o¤er for all available suppliers, is still optimal, and compare this
optimal o¤er to the corresponding classical monopsonist price under certainty. We also
study the limiting properties of personalized prices as the aggregate uncertainty vanishes.
While  to the best of our knowledge  this question has never been posed before,
Bulow and Roberts (1989) have shown that the mathematical problem of setting the
optimal monopsony price is the same as setting the optimal reserve price in an auction,
independently of the number of bidders. In other words, the optimal auction for ex ante
identical suppliers involves a (common) reserve price, which equals the optimal take-it-or-
leave-it o¤er to a single supplier: the monopsony price. Since Bulow and Roberts allow for
supply uncertainty and obtain uniform (reserve) prices, one might consider that posted
1This is the eqivalent of the Lerner index for monopsony, the di¤erence between the buyers valua-
tion of the marginal unit and the price as a proportion of the price: P (S(p)) pp .
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prices continue to be optimal.2 However, setting (possibly personalized) prices and setting
reserve prices in an auction are conceptually di¤erent mechanisms. First, even though
the optimal auctiontreats suppliers symmetrically, the realized price(s) will often fall
short of the reserve price, the competition among suppliers reduces their information rent;
second, an auctionis a centralized mechanism.3 That is, the terms of trade between the
monopsonist and any individual seller depend on the trades with other suppliers. Putting
it di¤erently, the buyer commits for any given supplier not only to the way in which he
will use the information she reveals, but also to how he will use the information revealed
by all the other suppliers. Instead, we wish to investigate monopsony pricing when the
buyer is not able/willing to commit to a centralized mechanism.4
Thus, we consider the same problem of a monopsonist with multi-unit demand who
is faced with a nite number of ex ante symmetric, capacity constrained suppliers of
privately known costs, but maintaining decentralized interaction: the monopsonist may
o¤er prices personalized to each supplier committing to trade at those prices if accepted
but this is all he can do. That is, agreements/commitments are bilateral: the terms of
trade with each supplier is independent of the terms of trade with other suppliers. As we
discuss in the conclusions, this personalized-pricing procedure is also a useful ingredient
in models of price competition, where it leads to novel insights.
Our rst result is to show that, under mildconditions on the distribution function
of costs, when suppliers are ex ante identical the personalized prices are all the same
2Although one has to be careful with extending the equivalence between setting optimal prices
and reserve prices beyond the environment of Bulow and Roberts (1989). For example, Burguet and
Sákovics (1999) show that identical competing sellers will not set reserve prices equal to marginal cost
in their auctions despite what happens in Bertrand competition.
3And not even optimal, at that. As argued in Bulow and Roberts (1989), for a monopsonist with
full commitment power, in the optimal mechanism the monopsonist announces a demand curve and
solicits ask prices by sellers. The resulting aggregate supply schedule together with the announced de-
mand is used to establish the market clearing price at which all the suppliers with ask prices below it
trade. Of course, in order to reduce the sellersinformation rents, the announced demand schedule is
distorted relative to the monopsonists true demand function.
4For empirical evidence of rms using second-best organizational form (and thus pricing) see, for
example, Thomas (2011) and references therein. See also McElheran (2014) on delegation. For a theo-
retical overview of decentralization see Mookherjee (2006).
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and as a result, posted, i.e., linear, prices are constrained optimal. The condition we
identify is a strengthening of the traditional regularitycondition in problems of trade
under asymmetric information, that the virtual cost5 of an arbitrary supplier has to be
increasing. Basically, we need a steeper slope for the virtual cost the more inelastic the
demand is and the fewer suppliers there are. Additionally, the range of possible costs
comes into play. When there is a gap between the lowest possible cost and the lowest
marginal valuation, the monopsonist may prefer to make fewer (serious) o¤ers than there
are traders (and demand). If on the other hand, there is a gap between the highest possible
cost and the highest marginal valuation, the monopsonist may prefer to make some o¤ers
that are surely accepted in addition to di¤erent o¤ers at lower prices. Notably, however,
if the slope condition is met, all interior prices (that is, prices that will be refused and
accepted both with positive probability) are the same. It is only if the cost distribution
of suppliers is particularly bumpythat we observe heterogeneous interior prices o¤ered
to homogeneous suppliers.
We also show that even though the buyer o¤ers a posted price, this price can be
lower or higher than the corresponding classical monopsony price (roughly depending on
whether the demand function is concaveor convex, respectively). The reason stems
from the fact that the monopsony price is determined by a point elasticity, while the
personalized price is optimized by taking expectations over the aggregate uncertainty.
Next, we introduce heterogeneity in cost distributions and show that, contrary to the
classic result, it is not necessarily the case that the less elastic market is o¤ered the lower
price. We nd conditions for that to be the case. Just as the ones for the optimality
of posted prices, these conditions are related to the slope of the monopsonists demand
function. Finally, we establish our convergence result: as supply is broken up into more
and more suppliers, the outcome of our mechanism converges to the textbook monopsony
pricing against a continuous supply function and the conditions for posted prices to be
optimal are eventually always satised.
5If costs are random draws from the distribution function F (c), the virtual cost function is given by
c+ F (c)=f(c) (c.f. Myerson, 1981).
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1.1 A brief review of the literature
The literature on optimal trading mechanisms6 is not directly relevant, as our interest
here is in a second best. Another strand of the literature makes pairwise comparisons
between bargaining, auctions and posted prices.7 Again, this is very di¤erent from our
approach, where we stay with the standard pricing mechanism and investigate the benets
of discrimination in a hitherto unexplored context. Let us discuss some of the papers that
are more closely related to our proposed mechanism.
Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) consider a seller with commitment power who is visited
by buyers in sequence until she sells her unit. They show that the optimal strategy is
a common take-it-or-leave-it price. Of course, due to the sequential resolution (and the
unique item on o¤er) the aggregate uncertainty is minimal in this model.
Winter (2004) also obtains that o¤ering di¤erent prices to identical agents is useful.
However, in his case the principal is using (some of the) prices as a coordination device
in a multiple-equilibrium scenario.
Alonso et al. (2008) also look at the possibility of decentralized organizational struc-
ture but they assume that the monopsonist is constrained to name a single price. There-
fore, the issue that determines whether a centrally set price or delegation to one of the
local managers is optimal is how local managers are willing to report their private in-
formation about demand. As it turns out, when they are expected to widely disagree,
decentralization is optimal.
Chen and Ishida (2013) consider the benets of personalized pricing in a dynamic
context. They show that price discrimination can increase a sellers expected prot if she
can commit to dynamic price schedules. Otherwise, the ability to price discriminate not
only is useless but can even harm the seller.
Finally, the logic of calculating expected marginal valuations is reminiscent of the
analysis of Martin and Pindyck (2015) of the benet of averting one catastrophe of several
6Harris and Raviv (1981) is the classical study of the best mechanism of a single price setter faced
with asymmetric information.
7Notable early contributions are Bester (1993) and Wang (1993, 1995).
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impending ones.
2 The set-up: personalized pricing
Consider a risk neutral monopsonist with (marginal) willingness to pay vl 2 [0; 1] for the
lth unit of a homogeneous good, l 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Qg, with v1 = 1 and vl  vl+1. There
are Q unit-supply sellers8. Each seller has a unit capacity. Seller is cost (reservation
price) is ci and it is is private information. From the monopsonists  and the other
sellerspoint of view, ci (Seller is type) is the realization of an independent random
variable, with strictly increasing and common knowledge distribution function Fi(:)
and (di¤erentiable) density function fi(:) on [ci; ci], where 0  ci < ci  1. To retain
simplicity and focus, we assume that Fi(:) is regular : ci +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
is monotone increasing.9
We study monopsony pricing as implemented by a simultaneous personalized o¤er to
each seller, with full commitment. Note that, since there is aggregate uncertainty, and as
with a posted price, the buyer risks having to acquire too many (or too few) units: he
cannot adjust the prices and quantities ex post. This is an additional ingredient to the
usual trade-o¤ under complete information, between paying a low price and increasing
the amount bought, that the monopsonist needs to take into account.
For claritys sake, we rst consider ex ante identical sellers, where each sellers cost is
independently drawn from the same F (:). We will later relax the symmetry assumption
(c.f. Section 5).
Before continuing with our analysis, we rst specify the benchmark case of classical
monopsony and relate it to our personalized pricing model.
8As we allow for vi = 0 and as the demand for a higher number of units than there are available
sellers would never be satised, it is without loss of generality to assume that both maximum aggregate
supply and demand are Q units.
9This is the assumption that ensures that the rst-order conditions imply the second-order condi-
tions in the standard auction design problem (c.f. Myerson, 1981).
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2.1 The benchmark: classical monopsony
The classical monopsony model postulates a buyer with a continuous,10 weakly decreasing
(inverse) demand function, V (:) that we can normalize, so that V (0) = 1 and V (Q) = 0.
To t with our discrete set-up, we assume that V (:) is a left continuous step function, with
its steps at integer values: V (x)  vn for x 2 (n  1; n]. The buyer faces a di¤erentiable,
increasing (inverse) supply function S(:). On the supply side, our set-up also reduces to
the classical model if we remove the uncertainty about the costs, so that the total supply
at price p coincides with the expected quantity that the Q suppliers are willing to sell at
that price: S 1(p) = QF (p).
With this analogue, the optimal monopsony quantity, qM , calculated by equating
marginal valuation with marginal expenditure, would be the solution11 to
V (qM) =
dqMS(qM)
dqM
= S(qM) + qMS 0(qM): (1)
The optimal monopsony price would then be pM = S(qM), which gives us a translation
of (1) into prices:
V (S 1(pM)) = pM + S 1(pM)S 0(S 1(pM)) = pM +
S 1(pM)
(S 1)0 (pM)
: (2)
Substituting QF (pM) for S 1(pM), we obtain12
pM +
F (pM)
f(pM)
= V (QF (pM)): (3)
That is, the monopsonist posts a price that equates his marginal valuation with what
in our model is the virtual cost of an arbitrary seller. Equation (3) can also be written as
equality between the inverse of the supplys elasticity and the markdown.
10To highlight the consequences of indivisibilities in our model, we assume as the textbooks that
the underlying supply and demand are continuous. The consequences of discontinuities in the classical
context are standard.
11The discontinuity is resolves by taking the inmum of quantities that lead to inverse (virtual) sup-
ply (the RHS) higher than inverse demand (the LHS).
12Given regularity, this equation has a unique solution.
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3 The super-regular case
The rst question is, then, whether personalized pricing in the presence of supply uncer-
tainty will also result in identical individual price o¤ers. As we will argue, the answer is
a¢ rmative if the probability distribution of costs satises an assumption that is stronger
than regularity. In Section 4, we discuss what might happen when the assumption is not
satised.
Unlike in the case of regularity, where the restriction on the allowable cost (i.e., supply)
distribution is exogenous, in our denition the constraint depends on the demand function
as well.13
Denition 1 The distribution of costs, F (:), is super-regular relative to fvlgl=1;2;:::;Q if:
i)14 c + F (c)
f(c)
  F (c) max
l2f1;2;:::;Qg
fvl   vl+1g is strictly increasing in c, and ii) F (:)s support
includes that of the demand (c = 0, c = 1).
The slope restriction is stronger than regularity as  F (c) is strictly decreasing. It
serves to ensure that it is suboptimal for the buyer to target di¤erent parts of the supply
separately à la third-degree price discrimination (e.g. in case of a multi-peaked supply
density). The support restriction makes sure that the probability that any positive o¤er
is accepted is positive and that no o¤er below the maximum valuation will be accepted
for certain. For l 2 f0; 1; :::; Q  1g, let
l(x) =

Q  1
l

F (x)l(1  F (x))Q l 1;
the probability that l out of Q 1 (independent) draws from the distribution F are below
x.
Proposition 1 When the cost distribution is super-regular relative to the buyers mar-
ginal valuation of each unit, the optimal personalized pricing strategy is a unique (posted)
13It is straightforward to strengthen the assumption to be independent of V (:): just substitute 1 for
max
l2f1;2;:::;Qg
fvl   vl+1g.
14We let vQ+1 = 0.
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price pD satisfying
pD +
F (pD)
f(pD)
=
Q 1X
l=0
l(p
D)vl+1: (4)
Proof. See the Appendix.
In other words, under super-regularity, the buyer does not (ab)use his ability to price
discriminate: he o¤ers to buy at the same price from all sellers. Thus, even under (aggre-
gate) uncertainty of supply, our model o¤ers a well-founded, game-theoretic foundation
for "posted prices". This qualitative feature coincides with what is an assumption in the
classical monopsony model. It is of particular note that this is not a convergence result:
the one price result holds for any number of sellers.
The optimality of committing to buy from all comers may be somewhat surprising.
Consider, for example, the extreme case when the buyer is looking for a single unit (and
so vl = 0 for all l > 1) from a large number Q of suppliers. The intuition for making a
serious o¤er to each seller even in this situation is, nonetheless, simple. If the buyer did
not make a serious o¤er to some seller then his prot made on her would be zero. On
the other hand, as long as the expected marginal valuation of the unit o¤ered by this
seller conditional on the o¤ers made to the other sellers is positive, by making an o¤er
below this value, the monopsonist would receive a positive expected net marginal payo¤.
The expected marginal valuation of that sellers unit could be zero only if the entire
demand is satised with probability one with the o¤ers to the other sellers. However, in
equilibrium that cannot happen. It would entail making an o¤er of 1 to (at least) one
seller, leading to non-positive prots (on that seller). As a result, the optimal policy for
the monopsonist must include serious o¤ers to all sellers. Note that this intuition only
relies on the support restriction in super-regularity. The constraint on the slopes of the
cost distribution and the demand ensures that the system of rst-order conditions has a
unique, uniform solution.
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3.1 Posted prices and uncertainty
The fact that, under super-regularity, the buyer names the same price for all sellers does
not imply that this price coincides with the classical monopsony price. The decentralized
posted price, pD in (4), di¤ers from the classical monopsony price, pM in (3), construed
as the optimal posted price when supply is (deterministic and) smooth and equals F (p).
The left-hand side of (3) and (4), the marginal expenditure (or virtual cost), is com-
mon to both expressions. However, the optimal price in the classic monopsony problem
equates this marginal expenditure to the (marginal) willingness to pay at the optimal
quantity. On the contrary, the optimal monopsony price under uncertainty, pD, equals
that marginal expenditure to the expectation of the marginal willingness to pay. That is,
pM depends only on the demand function evaluated at the optimal quantity (the trade-o¤
that determines it is local), whereas pD in (4) depends on the entire demand function.
Not surprisingly, there is no general ranking of these prices. The following example
illustrates.
Example 1 Assume F (x)  x and there are three available sellers. Consider the fol-
lowing family of demand functions:15 v1 = 1, v2 = y, and v3 = 0. Using (1) it is
straightforward to verify that for y  2=3, pM = 1=3. On the other hand, (??) becomes
2c = (1  c)2 + 2(1  c)cy, leading to c2(1  2y)  (4  2y)c+ 1 = 0. It is straightforward
to check that for y > :5 this leads to pD > 1=3, and for y < :5 it leads to pD < 1=3.
Note that in the above example the threshold value of y = :5 corresponds to V (:) being
linear. This is not a coincidence. We can show in general that if V (:) is concavethen
pM  pD. This is a useful result as in most cases marginal valuations are at least weakly
decreasing. Unfortunately the step-function nature of demand means that to make the
result precise we need a few denitions.
Denition 2 For a step function f , denote by xf the highest value of f that is no greater
than x.
15For simplicity we work with discontinuous demand functions, it is trivial to see that the results
would hold with arbitrarily close continuous approximations.
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This is a rounding device, just like the integer value function, but instead of the set
of integers it uses the values of the step function. Next, we need to modify the denition
of concavity for step functions (that are obviously not concave in the standard sense):
Denition 3 We say that the left-continuous step function f(:) with steps at i 2 f1; :::; Qg,
is step-concave if and only if for all (i; j) 2 f1; :::; Q   1g  f2; :::; Qg with i < j and
a 2 (0; 1) : af(i) + (1  a)f(j)f  f(ai+ (1  a)j).
We can now extend Jensens inequality to step functions:
Theorem 2 (Jensens inequality) Let f be a left-continuous step function with steps at
i 2 f1; :::; Qg and (p;x) a lottery with x values in f1; :::; Qg. If f is step-concave thenX
pif(xi)f  f (
P
pixi).
We can now state our result:
Proposition 2 If V (:) is step-concave then pM pDV .
In other words, when the cost distribution is super-regular and the demand function
is step-concave, the Bulow-Roberts intuition16 holds in our model: the price under uncer-
tainty is lower than in the classical model. However, when either of these conditions is
violated, the situation can change: we can have multiple prices and/or the price(s) o¤ered
can exceed pM (c.f. Example 1).
4 The possible consequences of prescinding from super-
regularity
While super-regularity is a reasonable assumption, it is clearly not always satised, in
particular when the number of suppliers is not large. It is therefore pertinent to investigate
16Recall that they say that the reserve price is same as the monopsony price and thus the actual
price is (weakly) lower.
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the consequences of the failure of its components. The proof of Proposition 1 hints at what
we might expect. Here we discuss these factors in some detail and provide examples (with
a given number of available sellers) to illustrate them. In Subsection 6 we will show that,
nonetheless, all the complications that might result from the failure of super-regularity
disappear in the limit as the number of supplier gets large (and their capacities decrease
to zero).
4.1 Uniform pricing depends on the slope restriction
When the slope restriction in super-regularity fails, the monopsonist may optimally price
discriminate between otherwise symmetric sellers, even if classical regularity is main-
tained. Note that this discrimination is di¤erent from third degree price discrimination
in that all suppliers are still assumed ex-ante identical. That is, the endogenous price
discrimination does not depend on any exogenous characteristic of suppliers.
The expected value of the marginal lth unit that the buyer acquires increases by the
step size multiplied by the probability of trade with the last inframarginal trader. This
needs to be factored into the regularityof the virtual cost. When vl may be signicantly
larger than vl+1, then given that a high o¤er is made to a seller, and so the probability
that the lth unit is acquired is high, the optimal o¤er to another seller may be low, and
vice versa: if the o¤er made to the former is low, the best o¤er to the latter may be high.
Consider the following example:
Example 3 Assume that v1 = 1 and v2 = 0, and that there are only two (identi-
cal) sellers. Let F (x) = x10 for x 2 [0; 1]. Note that d(x+F (x)=f(x))
dx
= 1:1 > 0 but
d(x+F (x)=f(x) F (x))
dx
= 1:1   10x9 < 0 for x > :783. With the help of Mathematica it is
immediate to see that there are three real solutions to the system of rst-order conditions.
A symmetric one with b = :8051 and two asymmetric ones with bi = :5714 and bj = :9057.
Substituting them into the objective function, the rst leads to an expected buyer prot of
:0315, while the latter(s) to :0352. Thus, the optimal price vector is asymmetric.
This result is an interesting parallel with Kotowski (2018), who has shown that when
12
the type distribution of ex ante symmetric bidders is not regular, asymmetric reserve
prices might be optimal for the bid-taker.
4.2 The number of surely accepted o¤ers in a market depends
on c
Let us turn to the option of making surely accepted o¤ers. For the monopsonist, these
have the obvious advantage of reducing uncertainty on the extensive margin. These o¤ers
practically remove the highest valued units from the demand and a corresponding number
of suppliers from the supply, so that the posted priceresult holds only for the residual
market.
The intuition here is also reminiscent of the setting of a reserve price in a standard
auction, where the lowest buyer valuation is much higher than the sellers. In that case,
a sale for the lowest possible valuation is so valuable that the marginal gain in price does
not compensate for risking to lose the sale. In the procurement context, we have the
same scenario: since the good can be bought for certain for a price that is a fraction
of its valuation, the expected gain from a more aggressive price o¤er cannot outweigh
the expected loss from possibly not buying it. The key factor therefore is the expected
valuation of the unit minus the highest possible cost. When this di¤erence is su¢ ciently
large, it is optimal to make an o¤er that cannot be refused.
The following example illustrates.
Example 4 Assume that v1 =1, v2 = 0:2, there are only two sellers, and F (x) =4x
with support [0; :25]. (4) becomes :8p + 1   4p = 2p, with solution p = 5=26  :192 and
corresponding prot  = 10=13  :769. If instead, the buyer sets one price equal to :25
(which is accepted for certain) and the optimal price of :1 for the other seller, his expected
prot is :75 + :1 :1
:25
= :79. Note that the optimal monopsony price without uncertainty of
costs, as in Subsection 2.1, would be :125, buying one unit and expecting a prot of :875.
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4.3 The number of serious o¤ers in a market depends on c
When c > 0, any serious o¤er entails a price bounded away from zero. That is, if the
buyer makes a number of o¤ers above the number of units for which he has positive
willingness to pay, then he risks incurring a loss that is also bounded away from zero. As
the expected value of the marginal unit is not bounded away from zero, it may be optimal
to make o¤ers to only some of the potential sellers. The following example illustrates this
possibility.
Example 5 Assume that v1 = 1 and v2 = 0, and that there are only two sellers. Let
F (x) = x c
1 c with support [c; 1]. If only one serious o¤er is made then 
1(b) = (1 b)F (b),
and the rst-order condition is 1 = F (b)=f(b) + b. Substituting in for F , we obtain
b = 1+c
2
and thus 1 = 1 c
4
. If two (equal)17 serious o¤ers are made then the expected
prot is 2(b) = 1  (1  F (b))2   2F (b)b, leading to the rst-order condition 1  F (b) =
F (b)=f(b) + b. Substituting in for F , we obtain b = 1+c c
2
3 2c and thus 
2 = (1 c)
2
3 2c . It is
straightforward to see that 1 > 2 if (and only if) c > 1=2.
5 Third-degree price discrimination
Aggregate uncertainty might also a¤ect the direction of third-degree price discrimination.
Recall that, according to the classical multi-market monopsony model,18 the buyer should
optimally o¤er a higher price to the market with the higher price elasticity of supply. This
result need not hold in our model with uncertainty.
Indeed, let us reintroduce ex ante (observable) asymmetry among sellers. To consider
the simplest case, suppose there are two marketswith Q1 and Q2 sellers, their cost
distributions being F (:) andG(:), respectively. In order to calculate the expected marginal
value we rst need to calculate the probability that l items are sold when the buyer o¤ers
p1 toQ1 sellers in market 1 and p2 toQ2 sellers in market 2. First, let us denote by il(x;K)
the value of l(x) when Q = K and the distribution function is the one characterizing
17Recall that uniform pricing is driven by the slope restriction in super-regularity.
18See, for example, Tirole (1988) page 137.
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suppliers in market i, for i = 1; 2. Also, and to save in notation, let il(x;K) = 0 whenever
l  K. We should also introduce an additional piece of notation:
 
l
(p1; p2;K1; K2) =
lX
k=0
1k(p
1;K1)2l k(p2;K
2):
 
l
represents the probability that l o¤ers are accepted when Ki are made to sellers in
market i, each with a price of pi. We can now write the corresponding system of equations
for (4) as
Q1+Q2X
j=1
 
j 1(p
1; p2;Q1   1; Q2)vj = F (p
1)
f(p1)
+ p1 (5)
Q1+Q2X
j=1
 
j 1(p
1; p2;Q1; Q2   1)vj = G(p
2)
g(p2)
+ p2: (6)
It is now straightforward to generalize Proposition 1 to two (or more) classes of sellers.
Corollary 1 When both cost distributions are super-regular relative to the buyers mar-
ginal valuation of each unit, the optimal personalized pricing strategy is a posted price in
each market, satisfying (5)-(6).
We are not particularly interested in the uniqueness of the pairs of (uniform) prices
solving the rst-order conditions. (In case there are several, the buyer simply chooses the
pair maximizing his expected utility.)
Returning to third-degree price discrimination, note that in the solution to (5), the
monopsonist again equals the marginal expenditure in market 1 (the right hand side) to
the expected willingness to pay for the marginal unit, the left hand side. The subtle point
here is that this expectation is taken conditional on all o¤ers made in market 2, and all
but one made in market 1. Similarly, the solution to (6) depends on the same expectation
but conditional on all but one o¤ers in market 2 and all o¤ers in market 1.
Note that, for K1 +K2   1  l  1,
 
l
(p1; p2;K1; K2) (7)
= (1  F (p1)) 
l
(p1; p2;K1   1; K2) + F (p1) 
l 1(p
1; p2;K1   1; K2)
= (1 G(p2)) 
l
(p1; p2;K1; K2   1) +G(p2) 
l 1(p
1; p2;K1; K2   1):
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Indeed, the second line above simply separates one supplier from the rst market, com-
putes the probability that l units are obtained from the K1   1 and K2 other suppliers,
and the probability that l  1 units are obtained from them. Then multiplies these prob-
abilities by the probability of obtaining no unit or one unit from the separated supplier,
respectively. The third line is a similar exercise with a separated supplier from market 2.
Using (7), we can write the left-hand side of (5) as
Q1+Q2X
j=1
 
j 1(p
1; p2;Q1   1; Q2)vj
= (1 G(p2))
Q1+Q2 1X
j=1
 
j 1(p
1; p2;Q1   1; Q2   1)vj +
G(p2)
Q1+Q2 1X
j=1
 
j 1(p
1; p2;Q1   1; Q2   1)vj+1
=
Q1+Q2 1X
j=1
 
j 1(p
1; p2;Q1   1; Q2   1)vj
 G(p2)
Q1+Q2 1X
j=1
 
j 1(p
1; p2;Q1   1; Q2   1)(vj   vj+1);
where we have also used the fact that
 
0
(p1; p2;Q1   1; Q2) = (1 G(p2)) 
0
(p1; p2;Q1   1; Q2   1);
 
Q1+Q2 1
(p1; p2;Q1   1; Q2) = G(p2) 
Q1+Q2 2
(p1; p2;Q1   1; Q2   1)
Similarly for the left hand side of (6). Thus, we can write (5)-(6) as
Ep1;p2vj =
F (p1)
f(p1)
+ p1 +G(p2)Ep1;p2vj;
Ep1;p2vj =
G(p2)
g(p2)
+ p2 + F (p1)Ep1;p2vj;
where Ep1;p2vj =
PQ1+Q2 1
j=1  j 1(p
1; p2;Q1  1; Q2  1)vj is the expected (marginal) value
of a unit bought from a supplier, given the o¤ers made to Q1   1 suppliers in market 1
and to Q2   1 suppliers in market 2; and Ep1;p2vj is the expectation of the marginal
increase in this value relative to the case where one more unit is bought from the other
sellers, vj = vj   vj+1, Ep1;p2
PQ1+Q2 1
j=1  j 1(p
1; p2;Q1   1; Q2   1)(vj   vj+1).
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Now recall that the price elasticity of supply in market 1 is
"s1 =

dF (p)
dp
p
F (p)
 1
=

f(p)
F (p)
p
 1
:
Thus, the supply elasticity of a market at any price is proportional to the (inverse) hazard
rate. The intuition becomes clear if we write the optimal pricing formula in terms of the
hazard rate
Ep1;p2vj   p1 = F (p
1)
f(p1)
+G(p2)Ep1;p2vj (8)
Ep1;p2vj   p2 = G(p
2)
g(p2)
+ F (p1)Ep1;p2vj:
The inverse (reverse) hazard rate may be higher, yet the optimal price in that market
may be lower.
Note that, for all prices, Ep1;p2vj  maxj vj. Thus, once again, aggregate uncer-
tainty may results in changes that are related to the the additional term F (x) maxj vj.
Combining the two equations in (8) we obtain
G(p2)
g(p2)
  F (p
1)
f(p1)
+
 
F (p1) G(p2)Ep1;p2vj = p1   p2:
Recall that reverse-hazard-rate dominance implies rst order stochastic dominance. Then,
the following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 3 Suppose that both F and G are super-regular relative to fvlg, and for any
p, F (x)
f(x)
< G(x)
g(x)
(F reverse-hazard-rate dominates G; i.e., market 1s supply is more elastic
than market 2s). A su¢ cient condition for the optimal monopsony price in market 1 to
be larger than that in market 2 is that for all x
F (x)
f(x)
  F (x) max
j
vj  G(x)
g(x)
 G(x) max
j
vj:
Thus, just as a strengthening of regularity guarantees that the posted prices are indeed
optimal for a monopsonist, strengthening of inverse hazard rate dominance along the same
lines guarantees that prices for a third-degree price discriminating monopsonist follow the
same pattern as in the classical model of monopsony.
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As an illustration that when the su¢ cient condition is not satised we can indeed
obtain the wrongprice ordering, consider the following example:19
Example 6 Let , Q1 = Q2 = 1 v1 = 1 and v2 = 0, F (x) = x and G(x) = x2 if x  :5
and G(x) = 1:5x  :5 for x > :5.20 Then (5)-(6) become
1  (p2)2 if p2  :5
1:5(1  p2) if p2 > :5
9=; = 2p1 (9)
1  p1 =
8<: 1:5p2 if p2  :52p2   1=3 if p2 > :5 :
Solving, we obtain p2 = 3 
p
5
2
< :5 < p1 =
p
5
2
 3 
p
5
2
, while the price elasticities are
p1  f(p1)
F (p1)
 1 < p2  g(p2)
G(p2)
= 2.
Once more, when the number of suppliers is large (and their capacity small, with
respect to the size of the market), maxj vj is small and (given regularity) the su¢ cient
condition in Proposition 3 is satised. Consequently, the expected values in the left hand
side of (5) and (6) for similar values of p1 and p2 approach, and then we recover the
predictions of the classical monopsony model. We now undertake to prove formally this
and previous convergence results. That is, to obtain the classical monopsony model as
the limit of our personalized price monopsonist.
6 Large markets and convergence
One of the goals of this paper is to provide a micro-foundation for the classical monopsony
model that relies on the buyer being able to make personal commitments to individual
suppliers, but without having the ability to make these commitments contingent on deal-
ings with other sellers. Thus, we now show that indeed, in the limit, where the buyer faces
19In fact, Example 3 could su¢ ce, if we consider each seller as a di¤erent market, since elasticity is
(constant and) equal in both markets in that case, yet prices are di¤erent.
20We cannot use G(x) = x2 as it is not super-regular, so we could not appeal to the corollary.
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a large number of (capacity constrained) small suppliers, his optimal price vector reduces
to classical monopsony pricing (c.f. Section 2.1) without any additional assumption.
Lets x an integer t and let  = 1
t
. Also, to save in notation without losing any
generality, let Q = 1. Suppose that each seller has an indivisible supply of  units to sell
with probability , and let si be the per-unit price the monopsonist o¤ers supplier i for
her supply. When t = 1, this is the model analyzed in the previous section, for Q = 1.
As t gets large, both the demand and the supply become a closer approximation of the
underlying continuous functions (V (:) and F (:)): vq

=
R q
q 
1

V (x)dx!t!1 V (q) and the
realization of tQ draws from F (:) converges to tQF (:) a.s. (by the Strong Law of Large
Numbers). In other words, as t increases without bound, our set-up converges to the
classical monopsony set-up. The question is whether our predictions converge as well.
The answer is a¢ rmative, and we will show it in two steps. First we will show that,
under symmetric pricing, (4) converges to (3). Next, we will argue that the optimal
solution to (4) near the limit must be symmetric, that is, a posted price, as long as F (:)
is regular, even if it is not super-regular.
Lemma 1 For any posted-price p,
Pt
j=1 vjj 1(p)!t!1 V (F (p)).
Proof. For each posted price p and given the total number of sellers t, the number j
of sellers (other than i) that accept the o¤er, n is a random variable with probability
distribution, 
n
(p), a binomial with parameters (t   1; F (c)). Also, by the Strong Law
of Large Numbers, these sellersaverage supply converges a.s. to QF (p) as t   1 ! 1.
That is, taking into account that each seller sells  = 1
t
when accepting the o¤er, and that
t 1
t
! 1, total supply of these t  1 sellers converges a.s. to F (c). That is,
Pr [jn  F (c)j < ]! 1; 8 > 0:
Therefore,
P
j=t=2(F (p) ;F (p)+) j 1(p) ! 0 as t ! 1, for all , and the result follows.
Lemma 2 For t su¢ ciently large, the optimal personalized pricing scheme is a posted
price.
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Proof. That interior prices must be uniform for high enough t follows immediately
from the proof of Proposition 1. We only need to observe that, as V (:) is continuous,
max
l
fvl   vl+1g converges to zero as t ! 1, and so H(b (j;k)) (an expectation of these
values) does too. Consequently, regularity is su¢ cient for a unique interior solution.
To show that for high enough t no extreme o¤er will be made, we will rst prove that
in equilibrium the marginal valuation must eventually be strictly above c. It then follows
that it is in the buyers interest to make serious o¤ers.
Take a price which is strictly above c (there must be at least one since c < 1 = v1).
The marginal valuation for this unit must be at least as much as the price. Now take
another price which is not serious. As t increases, the di¤erence between the marginal
valuations of these two units converges to zero, so the second unit is also worth a serious
price.
Next, note that unless the classical monopsony price equals c which happens if the
lowest marginal valuation is above the highest virtual cost it must be the case that, for
t large enough, the marginal valuation is less than the highest virtual cost, implying that
(4) has an interior solution.
Putting these two lemmas together, we have proved our main convergence result:
Proposition 4 For t su¢ ciently large, the buyer-optimal personalized price vector con-
verges to the classical monopsonists posted price.
It is also a straightforward corollary from Proposition 3 that the direction of third-
degree price discrimination also xes itself when sellers are small:
Corollary 2 For t su¢ ciently large, the market with higher price elasticity is o¤ered the
higher price.
The assumption that the underlying (inverse) demand V (:) function is continuous
greatly simplies the proof of these convergence results. We conjecture that it is possible
to extend the argument to an exogenously discontinuous demand, and to demonstrate
that our convergence results do not hinge on the continuity of V (:).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we delve into the micro-structure of monopsony and provide a decentral-
izedmechanism, whose limit is the standard model. We show that there is no need for an
invisible hand: under mild conditions, optimal pricing with personalized commitment
leads to a posted price even far away from the limit.
Our one-seller-one-unit set-up can be easily extended to multiunit sellers, as long as
they have constant marginal costs. While, our procedure would allow the buyer to make
a di¤erent price o¤er for each unit of a seller, optimally he would set a constant price for
all. Increasing (decreasing) marginal costs would introduce the usual incentives towards
distributing (concentrating) procurement over suppliers and would take us away from the
classical model.
We have dealt with bilateral commitment in static games. In dynamic games and
without dynamic (multilateral) commitment, the monopsonist could make their future
decisions depend on past realizations of trade. That dynamic monopoly problem is an
interesting extension of this paper.
The restriction to static mechanisms imposed by our main goal of microfounding
monopsony, makes it impractical to think about our model in a mechanism design context:
the sequential resolution of uncertainty would clearly be benecial. Nonetheless, it is of
note that our personalized pricing scheme is the best mechanism the buyer can devise
subject to bilateral commitment in the static context. Insisting on bilateral commitment
is the alternative approach to designing credible mechanisms where the principal does not
cheat because the incentives are set right, as in Li (2017) and Akbarpour and Li (2018).
Finally, it is important to point out that the personalized price setting mechanism
that we analyze in this paper can be usefully adapted to the context of competing price
setters. Burguet and Sákovics (2017a, 2017b, 2019) are witnesses to this. In the rst
paper, personalized pricing leads to a model of simultaneous price competition without
the need for rationing (in case, given prices, demand exceeds supply) or demand sharing
(in case, given prices, supply exceeds demand) as these are determined endogenously
by the equilibrium bid vectors. The equilibrium is unique even when marginal cost are
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increasing: the price is competitive with positive prots.
In the second paper there is competition for input between two rms that also compete
in the product market. Here, personalized pricing allows rms to strategically target their
o¤ers at the suppliers of their competitors. The competitive foreclosure that ensues
leads to higher aggregate input (and, therefore output and e¢ ciency), contrary to the
usual foreclosure logic, which tends to lead to ine¢ ciency.
The third paper extends the previous study to the case where the product market is
collusive, as in the competition for talent in a sports league. It provides micro-foundations
for some classical invariance theorems in the literature.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we show that there can be no two di¤erent interior prices. Take any two interior
prices, bj; bk. Given the rest of the prices, we can compute the probabilities that the
buyer obtains l 2 f0; 1; ::; Q  2g units from these other sellers. Let those probabilities be
denoted by ~l(b (j;k)). Then, the buyers expected prot can be written as
Q 2X
l=0
~l(b (j;k))

F (bk) + (1  F (bk))F (bj) vl+1 + F (bj)F (bk)vl+2   F (bj)bj   F (bk)bk	 :
To see this, note that, from the two sellers considered, the buyer will buy at least one
unit if either he buys from the kth seller (and either buys or not from the jth one) or if he
does not buy from the kth but buys from the jth seller. He will get a second unit if and
only if he buys from both. Finally, he pays each seller if and only if he buys from them.
Thus, the rst-order condition for bj is
Q 2X
l=0
~l(b (j;k))

f(bj)

F (bk)vl+2 +
 
1  F (bk) vl+1   bj  F (bj)	 = 0;
and similarly for bk. As
PQ 2
l=0
~l(b (j;k)) = 1, we can write this rst-order condition in
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the familiar way (c.f. (3)),
F (bj)
f(bj)
+ bj = bvj ,
where
bvj = Q 2X
l=0
~l(b (j;k))

F (bk)vl+2 +
 
1  F (bk) vl+1	
is the expected value of the unit potentially bought from seller j.21 We can rewrite
bvj = Q 2X
l=0
~l(b (j;k))vl+1   F (bk)
Q 2X
l=0
~l(b (j;k)) (vl+1   vl+2)
=
Q 2X
l=0
~l(b (j;k))vl+1   F (bk)H(b (j;k)),
where H(b (j;k)) =
PQ 2
l=0
~l(b (j;k)) (vl+1   vl+2). Then, the rst-order conditions with
respect to bj and bk imply
F (bj)
f(bj)
+ bj   F (bj)H(b (j;k)) = F (b
k)
f(bk)
+ bk   F (bk)H(b (j;k)) =
Q 2X
l=0
~l(b (j;k))vl+1  

F (bk) + F (bj)

H(b (j;k)) .
Therefore, if
b+
F (b)
f(b)
  F (b)H(b (j;k)) (10)
is strictly monotone, we must have bj = bk. Finally, observe that, since H(b (j;k)) =PQ 2
l=0
~l(b (j;k)) (vl+1   vl+2)  max
l
fvl   vl+1g, the strict monotonicity of b + F (b)f(b)  
F (b)max
l
fvl   vl+1g implies strict monotonicity of (10) and super-regularity implies the
former. Repeating this argument for every pair of sellers, we obtain that all interior prices
must be equal. Note that the above argument is independent of the support of F (:).
We now prove that no corner prices 0 or 1 can be charged in equilibrium, so a
posted interior price is indeed optimal. Assume that it is optimal to o¤er a price of 1
note that, given c  1, that is the lowest o¤er possibly accepted for certain  to a
seller. As the marginal value of this unit is bounded by 1, the maximum prot on this
transaction is zero, attained only when the expected marginal valuation is indeed 1. But
21Note that, by regularity, the second-order condition is satised.
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then, as the probability that a price p < 1 is accepted is F (p) > 0, o¤ering a lower price
would lead to a positive prot.
Next, assume that it is optimal to o¤er a price of 0 to a seller. Obviously, that would
lead to no prot on that seller. However, as long as there is a positive expected marginal
valuation for that lastunit, an o¤er to buy for a price above it will be accepted with
positive probability  note that, given c = 0, there are always seller types below any
positive value and thus lead to positive marginal prot. The only way not to have a
positive expected marginal valuation would be if the seller made at least one o¤er that is
certainly accepted. However, we have just shown that such an o¤er is never made.
Finally, to obtain (4) just note that
PQ 2
l=0
~l(p
D)

F (pD)vl+2 +
 
1  F (pD) vl+1	 =PQ 1
l=0 l(p
D)vl+1.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We prove by induction. Let us rst treat the trivial case where the lottery has two possible
prizes. As f is concave, we directly have that p1f(x1) + p2f(x2)f  f(p1x1 + p2x2). Now
assume the result holds for n prizes. Now assume that we have n+ 1 prizes. Write (note
the square brackets denote the integer part of an expression)
f
 
n+1X
i=1
p0ix
0
i
!
 f
 
(1  p0n+1)
nX
i=1
p0ix
0
i
1  p0n+1
+ p0n+1x
0
n+1
!
(11)
= f
 
(1  p0n+1)
 "
nX
i=1
p0ix
0
i
1  p0n+1
#
+ 1
!
+ p0n+1x
0
n+1
!
(12)
 (1  p0n+1)f
 "
nX
i=1
p0ix
0
i
1  p0n+1
#
+ 1
!
+ p0n+1f
 
x0n+1

f
; (13)
where the second equality follows from f being a step function with steps at integer values,
while the inequality follows from the concavity of f . Applying the result for n prizes we
obtain
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(1  p0n+1)f
 "
nX
i=1
p0ix
0
i
1  p0n+1
#
+ 1
!
+ p0n+1f
 
x0n+1

f
= (1  p0n+1)f
 
nX
i=1
p0ix
0
i
1  p0n+1
!
+ p0n+1f
 
x0n+1

f

(1  p0n+1)
nX
i=1
p0if(x
0
i)
1  p0n+1
+ p0n+1f
 
x0n+1

f
=
n+1X
i=1
p0if(x
0
i)
f
completing the proof.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Note that both prices are equating the virtual cost to: i) in the no uncertainty case the
demand function evaluated at the expected amount of trade; ii) in case of personalized
pricing to the expected value of the marginal valuation (demand). Thus, as the virtual
cost is increasing, all we need to show is that
Q 1X
l=0
l(p)vl+1  V (QF (p)) :
Since V (:) is step-concave, by Theorem 2
Q 1X
l=0
l(p)vl+1 =
Q 1X
l=0
l(p)V (l + 1)
V
 V
 
Q 1X
l=0
l(p)(l + 1)
!
:
It is immediate by the formula for the mean of the binomial distribution  that the
right-hand side equals V ((Q  1)F (p) + 1). Therefore, since V is decreasing, it follows
that
Q 1X
l=0
l(p)vl+1
V
 V (QF (p)) :
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